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Introduction 
Until recently, most of the attention in US climate 
policy was focused on legislative efforts to introduce 
a price on carbon through cap and trade. Since that 
policy has stalled, at least at the national level, the 
Clean Air Act has assumed the central role in the 
development of regulations that will reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the US. The 
modern Clean Air Act (CAA) was passed in 1970 
and conveys broad authority to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to develop regulations to 
mitigate harm from air pollution. In 2007 the 
Supreme Court confirmed that this authority 
applied to the regulation of GHGs (Massachusetts v. 
EPA).1 Subsequently, the agency made a formal, 
science-based determination that GHGs were 
dangerous to human health and the environment, 
which compels the agency to mitigate the harm and 
forms the basis for the agency’s regulation of GHG 
emissions.  
 
                                                      
1 549 US 497 (2007). 
 
In 2011 the EPA implemented the regulations 
affecting two major sectors of the economy – new 
corporate average fuel efficiency standards for cars 
and trucks, and construction permitting for major 
new and modified sources, such as power plants and 
industrial facilities. The third regulatory action 
anticipated by the EPA will be the development of 
operating performance standards affecting new and, 
in particular, existing stationary facilities.2 Existing 
facilities are the source of the largest share of GHGs 
emissions and provide the greatest opportunity for 
cost-effective reductions in emissions according to 
economy-wide modelling (EIA, 2009).  
While the EPA regulatory framework unfolds at the 
federal level, policy efforts at the state and regional 
level also continue to evolve and to influence the 
direction for federal policy. Since 2009, 10 northeast 
states launched a cap and trade programme 
                                                      
2 Standards under §111(b) of the CAA apply to new sources 
(these are termed New Source Performance Standards, or 
NSPS), and those under §111(d) to existing sources. 2 | DALLAS BURTRAW 
 
affecting electricity generation in the region, and 
California will introduce a similar programme in 
2013 that will evolve into an economy-wide 
programme in 2015. One important development 
will be how these programmes interact with the 
federal regulations under the Clean Air Act. 
This Policy Brief summarises the emerging 
regulations at the national level, reporting our 
assessment of potential emissions reductions under 
the Clean Air Act. We also describe the efforts at the 
subnational level, and the interaction of these 
policies with the Clean Air Act under the particular 
structure of so-called ‘environmental federalism’. 
This structure places central responsibility for 
implementation of regulations at the state level, 
making the architecture of existing state-level 
policies increasingly relevant and influential. 
Finally, we compare the Act with comprehensive 
cap and trade legislation that was proposed in the 
previous Congress, and argue that comparable 
emissions mitigation may be achieved in the 
domestic economy by 2020. The big difference likely 
to emerge in the short run is the ability of the US to 
meet its financing obligations under the Copenhagen 
agreement. And, in the long run, mitigation with a 
regulatory approach is likely to become increasingly 
expensive. 
1.  Emissions reductions under the Clean 
Air Act 
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA will use three sets 
of tools to mitigate GHGs. The first is new vehicle 
fuel economy standards regulations that took effect 
in January 2011, affecting vehicles beginning with 
the 2012 model year. The standards impose annual 
improvements in fuel efficiency of 5% a year raising 
the fleet average fuel efficiency for light trucks and 
sport utility vehicles to 30 miles per gallon (MPG) 
(7.84 litres/100km) by 2016, and to 39 MPG 
(6.03L/100km) for cars, resulting in a combined fleet 
average of 35.5 MPG (6.63L/100km). Over the next 
decade these standards are expected to roughly 
offset increases in vehicle miles travelled. By 2030, 
these standards are expected to reduce emissions 
from these vehicles by 21% compared to business as 
usual. Even stricter standards are in development 
that are expected to require additional fuel-efficiency 
improvements of 40%, to be phased in beginning in 
2017 and ultimately raising the combined fleet 
average equivalent to 54.5 MPG (4.32L/100km) by 
2025. Complementary regulations addressing 
medium- and heavy-duty vehicles will take effect in 
2014. 
The second tool is known as ‘new source review’, 
which requires permits for new construction and 
major modifications to existing stationary sources. 
Permitting requires site-specific, technology-based 
review of control technology. Permitting is usually 
done at the state level, although the technological 
inquiry is national in scope and subject to EPA 
oversight. Starting in January 2011, this permitting 
process applies to about 900 construction projects 
per year at sources that emit large quantities of 
GHGs.  
The third tool is regulatory standards that apply to 
the operation of stationary emissions sources. 
Ultimately, EPA decisions in this area will have the 
greatest effect on GHG emissions in the United 
States. The agency will apply performance standards 
(e.g. pounds of pollution per million British thermal 
units of energy input) for new sources in various 
source categories. The agency also has the authority 
to set guidelines for existing sources, and it has 
pledged to issue such standards contemporaneously 
with its release of standards for new sources. The 
EPA will begin by proposing rules for new and 
existing fossil-fired steam power plants and 
refineries in 2011 and finalise those rules in 2012. 
Existing steam boilers at power plants fuelled with 
coal, oil and natural gas, along with petroleum 
refineries account for more than one-third of GHG 
emissions in the United States. Conceivably, the EPA 
could issue standards that mandate large-scale 
substitution away from coal to natural gas or non-
emitting technologies. However, indications are that 
in 2012 the EPA will not issue standards that require 
a major substitution away from coal. Instead, the 
agency is looking initially at improving the 
operating efficiency of power plants and refineries.  
In its preliminary notice of a proposed rule-making, 
the agency indicated that operating efficiency at 
existing facilities might be improved by 2-5%, 
resulting in a comparable reduction in emissions 
without changing the electricity output from these 
facilities (EPA, 2008). A 5% reduction in emissions 
from existing coal-fired power plants would amount 
to over 90 million tonnes per year, or about 1.4% of 
total US emissions. The agency identified the 
possibility of additional emissions reductions of 2-
5% if coal-fired facilities co-fired with biomass. 
These potential emissions reductions would be 
consequential. We reviewed the total potential US CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY EFFORTS | 3 
 
emissions reductions and costs associated with 
short-term measures in six sectors (excluding 
transportation) that account for 62% of domestic 
emissions (Burtraw, Fraas & Richardson, 2011).3 
Existing studies identify opportunities to reduce 
emissions from these sectors by up to 10%, or 6.2% 
of total US emissions (see Table 1). These short-term 
measures, which include energy and process 
efficiency improvements, beneficial use of process 
gases and limited material and product changes, 
have been identified by various authors as ‘cost  
                                                      
3 We exclude transportation because the improvement in fuel 
efficiency approximately offsets increases in vehicle miles 
travelled through the end of this decade. 
effective’ – meaning they are zero-cost options for 
the firm after accounting for the cost of energy 
saved. These calculations are based on engineering 
costs; the broader economic costs, such as 
opportunity costs of scheduling investments and 
alternative use of space and resources, are not 
included. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in the 
table suggests that mitigation options are available 
at moderate costs to firms that could reach 6.2% of 
US emissions. 


























Average gross cost 
(2008$/tCO2e)** 
Iron and steel  1  72  19  0.19  14  1.54–2.58 
Pulp and paper  1.4–3  100–214  14  0.2–0.4  14–29  41.06 




20  1429*  1–10  0.2 – 2*  14–143  0.40–15.37 





34 2430  5–9 1.7–3.1  122–222  — 
Coal-fired: 
efficiency gains 
28 2001  2–5  0.56–1.4 40–100  10.74–63.91 
Coal-fired: 
biomass cofiring 
2–5  0.56–1.4 40–100  — 
Totals 61–63%  4388–4503*  N/A 2.34–6.19%*  167–442  N/A 
*Boilers double count emissions and reductions, potentially overstating total reductions by up to 0.6%.  
**Average cost does not include the cost savings from reduced energy use that make the listed measure cost effective from an 
engineering cost perspective (see text). Ranges indicate costs in different processes used in the sector. 
Notes: Attribution of percentage of emissions among sectors is based on EPA estimates. Specific measures identified may have 
already been implemented. Totals may not sum due to rounding. For additional discussion of sources and calculations, see 
Burtraw, Fraas & Richardson (2011). 
Source: Burtraw et al. 2011a.  
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be available under the CAA (Richardson, 2010). 
Only 10% of the reductions were expected to come 
from domestic sources covered by the emissions cap. 
The banking of allowances further clouds the 
assessment of emissions reductions under the 
Waxman-Markey legislation. Banked allowances can 
be used to cover emissions in excess of the cap at a 
later time; hence, while banking reduces short-term 
emissions and overall costs, it does not have an 
effect on long-term emissions. "If one were to ignore 
emissions reductions that are banked, and one were 
to scale back the total emissions reductions 
proportionally, the Waxman- Markey cap-and-trade 
programme would appear to achieve permanent 
domestic emissions reductions equal to just 6% 
below 2005 levels.  
It is largely a matter of perspective which 
benchmark one chooses to represent emissions 
reductions under Waxman-Markey: 33% including 
offsets, the President’s stated target of 17%, or 
domestic emissions reductions of 10% (6% if 
adjusted for the bank). However, these different 
benchmarks are important to keep in mind when 
evaluating the strictly domestic emissions reductions 
that might be achieved under the Clean Air Act in 
the domestic economy.  
We estimate reductions under the Clean Air Act 
could total 6% by 2020 from changes in the operation 
of existing facilities described in Table 1. 
Furthermore, there are other plausible reductions 
that are not included in Table 1. Under an emissions 
cap, emissions reductions from state and regional-
level programmes would not be additional (Goulder 
& Stavins, 2011). However, under a regulatory 
approach, emissions reductions at the subnational 
level would be additional to those required by 
regulation. And, as noted above, the estimates in 
Table 1 do not account for any switching of fuels in 
electricity generation. Accounting for these 
additional reductions could yield emissions 
reductions of up to 10% by 2020 under regulatory 
approaches, roughly matching those reductions that 
would have been achieved under cap and trade.
Conclusion 
In summary, regulatory measures could be expected 
to yield reductions that are comparable to what 
would have been achieved under comprehensive 
cap and trade legislation in the domestic economy 
by 2020. However, regulatory action would not be 
equivalent or preferable to new legislation from 
Congress, especially over the long term. Introducing 
a price on carbon would allow for the market to 
make decisions that ultimately can be expected to be 
more efficient than the actions of regulators. Also, in 
the long run the price signal could be expected to do 
a better job of igniting a technological transition and 
changing economic behaviour. But, at least in the 
short run, the regulator can see the low-hanging 
fruit and under the Clean Air Act much of this fruit 
will be harvested.  
Perhaps to the surprise of many, the US may be able 
to achieve mitigation outcomes comparable to the 
commitment made in Copenhagen for 2020, even in 
the absence of comprehensive cap and trade. The 
bigger challenge, and one that is unlikely to be 
satisfied under a regulatory approach, is how the US 
can meet its financing obligations without 
comprehensive climate legislation. Cap and trade 
provided a vehicle and incentive to direct private 
capital towards investment in developing countries 
through the purchase of emissions offsets. It also 
provided a source of funds for the federal 
government through the portion of allowances that 
would have been auctioned under the programme. 
In the absence of these policies, the US is likely to 
have great difficulty meeting its commitment to 
financing international investments. US CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY EFFORTS | 7 
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